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Abstrak
Tulisan ini membahas mengenai faktor yang melatarbelakangi ambiguitas sikap Tiongkok dalam
isu senjata otonom dan keterkaitannya dengan situasi kebangkitannya. Pada tahun 2016 di
United Nations on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN-CCW), Tiongkok merupakan satusatunya negara Permanent Five (P5) yang menyerukan pelarangan dan pentingnya protokol
mengikat mengenai senjata otonom. Melalui makalah posisinya, Tiongkok menyatakan bahwa
karakteristik senjata otonom tidak sesuai dengan prinsip dalam Hukum Humaniter Internasional
(HHI), kekhawatiran akan perlombaan senjata, hingga ancaman peperangan. Kendati demikian,
di tahun 2017, Tiongkok justru memunculkan New Generation of AI Development Plan’ (AIDP)
yang menjadi basis dari pengembangan senjata otonom Tiongkok. Tindakan tersebut menciderai
komitmen mereka di UN-CCW karena melalui AIDP maka Tiongkok telah merencanakan
penggunaan, pengembangan dan produksi senjata otonom. Dengan menggunakan kerangka
"technologically innovative imperative" dan konsepsi ambiguitas strategis, tulisan ini
berargumen bahwa ambiguitas sikap Tiongkok merupakan sebuah kesengajaan strategis, hasil
dari respon terhadap ketertinggalan teknologis dan hambatan sistemik yang tengah dihadapi
Tiongkok. Tulisan ini berkesimpulan bahwa; (1) ambiguitas sikap Tiongkok ditujukan untuk
menjaga konsistensi narasi "China’s Peaceful Rise"; (2) menghadapi dinamika "technologically
innovative imperative"; (3) membantu Tiongkok dalam meraih "China’s Dream" untuk mencapai
status sebagia negara besar ("great power").

Kata kunci:
Ambiguitas strategis, senjata otonom, techno-politik, transformasi militer Tiongkok.

Abstract
This paper discusses the factors behind China's ambiguous stance on the issue of autonomous
weapons and its relationship with China's rise. In 2016 at the United Nations on Certain
Conventional Weapons (UN-CCW), China was the only Permanent Five (P5) country to call for
the prohibition and importance of a binding protocol on autonomous weapons. Through its
position paper, China stated that the characteristics of autonomous weapons are not in
accordance with the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), fears of an arms race,
to the threat of war. However, in 2017 China issued the New Generation of AI Development Plan
(AIDP), which became the basis for China's development of autonomous weapons. This action
violates their commitment at the UN-CCW because, through AIDP, China has planned the use,
development, and production of autonomous weapons. Using the framework of the
technologically innovative imperative and the conception of strategic ambiguity, this paper
argues that China's ambiguous stance is a strategic intention resulting from a response to
technological lag and systemic barriers that China is currently facing. This paper concludes that
China's ambiguous stance is; (1) aimed to maintain the consistency of China's Peaceful Rise; (2)
dealing with technologically innovative imperatives dynamic; (3) helping China in achieving
China's Dream to achieve a Great Power status.

Keywords:
Strategic ambiguity, autonomous weapons, techno-politics, China’s military transformation
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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI)1 has become one of the essential features for a country in this
contemporary era. The development of new autonomous technologies, AI, and robotics
has an extensive application in society, bringing risks and opportunities. Concerning
technological sophistication and increased automation, many countries have begun to
develop military weapons that no longer require humans to operationalise. Autonomous
systems in weapons formed through AI's sophistication are also called Autonomous
Weapons Systems (AWS) (UNODA 2017, p.2). According to the ICRC (in UNODA
2017, p.2), autonomous weapons are any weapons systems with autonomous capabilities
that can select (search, detect, identify, track) and attack (use force to fight, neutralise,
damage, or destroy) targets without meaningful interference from humans. This definition
of AWS includes all weapons systems and vehicles that can select and attack targets
independently, including existing weapons and potential future systems (UNODA 2017,
p.6). According to Stop Killer Robots (in HRW n.d, p.1), countries like the United States,
United Kingdom, Russia, China, Australia, South Korea, and Israel are already
developing and starting to compete in AWS. The U.S. was the first country to include AI
in its military, followed by China and Russia, which have also made efforts to prevent
lags in the development of AWS (Arif 2019, p.1). Sander and Meldon projected that
global military spending on AWS will reach $16 billion by 2025 (Sander and Meldon
2014, p.5). The importance of developing AI, especially in the military, has been
expressed by President Vladimir Putin. Putin highlighted that "AI is the future, not only
for Russia but also for all of humanity. It comes with colossal opportunities and threats
that are hard to predict. Whoever becomes a leader in this field will become the ruler of
the world" (Arif 2019, p.1).
AI as a dual use technology can bring significant security risks to individuals, state
entities, organisations, industries, and the future of humanity. Any new development or
innovation in AI can be used for beneficial and destructive purposes. Pandya stated that
any single algorithm capable of providing critical economic applications could also lead
to producing an unprecedented mass destruction on a scale that is difficult to comprehend
(Pandya 2019, p.1). As a result, concerns about AI-based automation of weapon systems
are increasing. Various regulatory options have been proposed to overcome the
challenges that arise from this weaponry, ranging from international negotiations on preemptive international treaties to strengthening existing international laws. However, until
now, there is still no international consensus that can regulate the issue of AWS. The U.S.
2
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and Russia are the two prominent actors preventing negotiations on the ban on AWS
(Busby 2018, p.1). The U.S. and Russia, and other major military powers, including South
Korea, Israel, and Australia, also blocked progress towards an international agreement on
the ban on AWS at the 2018 conference in Geneva, which also involved the United
Nations (UN) (Busby 2018, p.1). The blocking was based on the application of AI in the
military in the contemporary era, which can provide various advantages. The
aforementioned states believed that AWS, which was being developed and designed by
the world's major powers, would; (1) have a much higher degree of autonomy with the
ability to detect targets, operate independently to make their own decisions to shoot or
kill without human intervention; (2) has a much greater ability than humans to collect and
process complex information at an extraordinary speed; (3) be able to operate more
precisely, quickly and flexibly; (4) not be affected by physical or emotional limitations
like humans, who can carry out tiring, protracted and dangerous routine tasks because this
system lacks emotions to cloud their judgment, such as fear, anger, selfishness, hysteria,
revenge, frustration, exhaustion or hunger (Geneva Academy 2014, p.1).
On the other hand, the development of AWS has been rejected by various parties
because AWS can pose a significant risk and has the potential to violate international law,
especially the law regarding armed conflict, due to the lack of meaningful human control
over these weapons (Sharkey 2012, p.1). Countries that have a position against and
disagree with the development and use of AWS, such as countries in parts of Africa and
Asia, state that the issue of AWS is very closely related to ethical issues, where human
life is said to have no value when machines are used to make the decision to kill (Sharkey
2012, p.1). In addition, AWS is believed to be able to change the pattern of war to be
unfair, disproportionate, and brutal (Sharkey 2012, p.1). Not only the majority of
developing countries reject the use or development of AWS, but more than 100 nongovernmental organisations, especially in the fields of human rights and humanitarian
law, have also joined in voicing their criticisms of AWS, including concerns about
operational risks, accountability, and compliance with the requirements of proportionality
and the law of armed conflict (Sharkey 2012, p.1).
The interesting thing about this issue is that China is showing an ambiguous
stance.2 This ambiguous stance on AWS can be seen through the position paper of China
as a High Contracting Party to the United Nations on Certain Conventional Weapons
(UN-CCW) at the Group of Governmental Experts Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems (GGE-LAWS) negotiations.34 At the GGE-LAWS negotiations in 2016, China
3
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was the only permanent member (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
that called for establishing a new international protocol that specifically regulates AWS
(Mohanty 2017, p.46). In its position paper, China stated that:

"As a hi-tech product, the use of AWS will lower the threshold and cost of war,
thus making the outbreak of wars easier and more frequent. Such systems cannot
effectively distinguish between soldiers and civilians and can easily cause
indiscriminate killing or wounding of the innocent" (China. Delegation to CCW
2016, p.1).
In its position paper, China committed to support the implementation of the
prohibition, restriction, and control of AWS in the military revolution (China. Delegation
to CCW 2016, p.1). However, this commitment did not last long because, in 2017, China
issued the 'New Generation of AI Development Plan' (AIDP) released by the Chinese
Parliament, which became the basis for China's development of AWS (Webster et al.
2017, p.1).5 According to the AIDP, China will develop various levels of technology,
especially the use of AI in the military. It will develop the so-called Hybrid New
Intelligent Architecture and New Technologies, which are innovations that combine AI
technology and weapons to become fully autonomous. China's action to issue AIDP has
violated their commitment to the UN-CCW because by issuing AIDP, China has planned
the development and production of AWS. This action has given rise to ambiguity in the
international community.
In response to this, in 2018, China supported the negotiation on the creation of a
new CCW protocol on AWS. However, different from the 2016 meeting, China this time
confirmed and further explained that the prohibition on AWS would be limited to their
"use" and not their development or production (Stop Killer Robot 2018, p.1). Table 1
shows countries' position on the development of AWS protocol:

4
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Table 1. Blocs in Development of Autonomous Weapons System (AWS) Protocol
States Who Support Treaty to
Ban AWS

Ambiguous Stance

States Who Opposed Treaty to Ban
AWS

Algeria
Argentina
Austria
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Djibouti
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ghana
Guatemala
Holy See
Iraq
Jordan
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
State of Palestine
Uganda
Venezuela
Zimbabwe

China

Australia
Belgium
France
Germany
Israel
Republic of Korea
Russia
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
United States of America
United Kingdom

Source: Stop Killer Robots (2019, p.1).

In the 2018 UN-CCW meeting, the Chinese delegation stated that China supports
the ban on the use of – but not the development of – AWS. China views that issues related
to AWS are humanitarian issues. Therefore, it was necessary to establish international
rules that control the issue. China is the only country to take this stance. China has also
stated that such weapons would not comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
and are therefore inherently illegal.
At the meeting of the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security)
of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2019, the
Chinese delegation gave a statement regarding the discussion on Conventional Arms
Control. China reiterated that AWS could raise international humanitarian, ethical, and
legal issues. Thus, it was vital to establish an international legally binding instrument on
AWS to prevent automated killings by machines (UN.org 2019, p.1). Not much different
from previous years, at the 2020 CCW meeting, the UN-CCW Report shows that China
continued to express its concern over AWS' ability to comply with the principles of
5
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proportionality and accountability in IHL. Together with Sri Lanka and the Philippines,
China has again called for the establishment of a legally binding instrument on AWS
(CCW Report 2020, p.1). At the 2021 CCW meeting, according to official commentaries
submitted by the delegation of China, China continued to call for the importance of
international legally binding instruments in regulating the AWS. China's position was
countered by the Republic of Korea, who argued that it was too early to discuss legally
binding norms at this point (CCW Report 2021a, p.1). At that time, China and countries
who support treaty to ban AWS underlined that AWS could not comply with the
principles in IHL, such as the principle of distinction, proportionality, and precaution
(CCW Report 2021b, p.1). Some analysts, such as Elsa B. Kania (2018) and Felix Sippel
(2020), also agreed that the position taken by China in the issue of AWS is considered an
ambiguous stance. The Position Papers prepared by China for the GGE-LAWS meeting
at the UN-CCW since 2016 indicate an interesting evolution in China's diplomatic
posture, characterised by its ambiguous, biased, and double-standard policy stance.
Some articles discussing China stated that after more than three decades of
economic reform and development, China can now stand as the world's economic giant
and is still growing. Some welcome China's participation on the world stage and its
emerging leadership in regional and global affairs, but some worry that China may rise to
avenge the past vengeance and humiliation it received at the hands of Western countries
(Kai 2017, p.1). With a total of 2.25 million soldiers, China has formed the most
significant armed forces globally (Dellios 2005, p.1). With its growing economy and
military, China has been identified as a rising power (Dellios 2005, p.1; Cordesman 2019;
Silver et el. 2019; Lendon 2021; Lemahieu 2019). Barry Buzan asserted that "China can
definitely present the most promising profile of a potential superpower and the one whose
degree of alienation from the dominant international society makes it the most obvious
political challenger" (Buzan 2004, p.70).
The rise of China has been named the main news story in the 21st century by the
Global Language Monitor, measured by the number of appearances in the global print
and electronic media (Global Language Monitor 2019, p.1). Many academicians have
also referred to China as an emerging "Second superpower" with global power and
influence on par with the U.S. (Wood 2000, p.155). Some consensus concludes that China
has reached the level of qualification of superpower status, citing China's growing
political power and leadership in the economic sector, which has given China a new
position in the international community. Despite its competent capabilities to challenge
6
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U.S. domination, China seems to prefer to play it safe and not be assertive, in the sense
that China's response and position on strategic issues looks very cautious and vague.
Previous articles on strategic ambiguity have only focused on how the state
benefits from this ambiguous attitude in general. Baliga and Sjostrom (2008, p.1023)
argued that states sometimes try to create ambiguity regarding their military capabilities
to maximise their interests. Maximising the interests obtained through strategically
ambiguous policies is an effort to prevent aggression without risking negative sanctions.
However, the state may still possess weapons that are prohibited under international
norms. Furthermore, Yu's writing on China and Strategic Ambiguity explains that since
the end of the Cold War, Western military leaders and strategists have consistently
pressured China to answer the question: "What is your intention to build a military on a
large scale?" (Yu 2018, p.1). This practice has proven the extent to which China has
succeeded in creating strategic ambiguity to obscure its motives to militarily challenge
the U.S., the only country that can militarily stop China's growing ambition. The policy
of strategic ambiguity that China uses is aimed at maximising profit potential and
avoiding conflicts and tensions that trigger losses (Yu 2018, p.1).
The author of this article aligns with Baliga and Sjostrom's (2008) and Yu's (2018)
explanations. They concluded that an ambiguous stance is an intentional act aimed at
maximising potential interests and avoiding tensions that trigger losses for the state.
However, studies on China's stance on AWS are still limited. The inadequacy of the
available literature raises the need to explore several alternative factors that can provide
a satisfactory answer regarding the correlation between strategic ambiguity and rising
powers' interests, especially in the case of China and AWS. This article is based on
questions regarding "Why has China taken an ambiguous stance in the issue of AWS? To
what extent is this stance related to China's interests as a rising power?"
In order to answer the research questions, first, this article will begin with a
description of the historical studies on China's strategic ambiguity practices and China's
perspective on technologically innovative imperatives in the context of its rise. The
second section is about China's rapid development of AWS and its strategic constraints.
The third section elaborates the argument that China's ambiguous stance is an intentional
strategy amid the AWS dynamics. This paper argues that although China is seen as the
most promising potential superpower and is said to be able to challenge the status-quo
power, China is not immediately trying to challenge U.S. hegemony. China is still
cautious and not yet firm in taking policies and positions on certain strategic issues. China
7
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still often tries to take a safe response or position on strategic issues to avoid contention
with the status quo power. In this case, China's ambiguous stance regarding the issue of
AWS is related to the dynamics of the technologically innovative imperative, especially
during its term as a rising power. First, China still finds itself in some technological lags
and systemic constraints resulting from its interaction with the U.S. as the dominant state.
Second, this lag prompted China to take peaceful measures to avoid circumstances that
could potentially trigger counter-productive tensions for China's innovation activities.
Third, China wants to ensure that its innovation efforts will not hinder its rise. Therefore,
along with its rising and the emergence of complexity in AWS development, China faces
several constraints and pressures, and the ambiguous stance finds its justification.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Rising Power and Innovative Imperative
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world order have marked a
transitional era of global governance. Twenty years later, there is still a lack of consensus
on the distribution of power in this multipolar world (Tank 2012, p.1). However, it can
be seen that new powers have emerged, seeking a global political role in proportion to
their increasing economic influence (Tank 2012, p.1). Countries that have significant
rapid economic development, political influence in the world order, cultural influence,
military power are countries classified as rising powers or new powers (Tank 2012, p.1).
Rising powers will change the dynamics of power in the international system by seeking
voice, exerting significant influence in international institutions, and building political
ties through regional organisations (Tank 2012, p.1). Rising power can exist to challenge
the status-quo power to reach the top of the hierarchy.
International Relations scholars have long recognised that technological
innovation plays a crucial role in the transition of power and, more broadly, international
politics (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555). Starting from the 1970s, Robert Gilpin
emphasised that significant advances in technology enable new states to achieve political
prominence (Gilpin 1981, p.182). Gilpin (1975, p.182) also added that the emerging
powers became dominant countries because they succeeded in developing innovations in
new industries or leading sectors that could sustain the dominant state's economic vitality
and military power (Gilpin 1981, p.182). The theory of the Technologically Innovative
Imperative means that rising power faces the need to acquire and develop new
technologies to overcome the structural challenges it faces and continue its international
8
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ascent to become a dominant state (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.556). The power transition
theory recognises that economic resources are the foundation of military power and many
other forms of power (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.556). When it emerged, technological
innovation was believed to be the saviour and driver of economic enhancement for rising
power (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555). This implies that rising power must be able to
face the challenge of catching up and not only relying on technology created by the
dominant state but also must be able to become more efficient in innovating new
technologies, including in production, industrial processes, and transactions (Kennedy
and Lim 2018, p.555).
Economic theory explains that innovation is essential to sustain sustainable
economic growth to achieve excellence. Therefore, rising states must pursue innovation
as a primary national interest (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555). IR scholars view the
critical role of technological advances in explaining the transition of power but have so
far ignored the challenges it poses to a rising power. Recognising these challenges would
allow us to consider how the need for technology and pursuing technology can limit rising
power in sustaining its rise. In addition, it would also allow us to consider the domains of
technology and innovation as a unique locus of great powers interaction, to the extent that
rising power's innovation activities can directly affect the strategic interests of the
dominant country.
Kennedy and Lim (2018, p.556) saw that new technological innovations by rising
power can be carried out in three stages, namely; (1) "create" in which the rising power
will support domestic manufacturers to develop new technologies; (2) "transacting" in
which the rising power will conduct commercial transactions with foreign entities that
result in technology transfer, due to the limitations of the rising power in mastering the
technology; (3) "take" which requires the acquisition of existing technology from the
outside world through non-transactional means. This includes actions aimed at
accelerating the general diffusion process, in which knowledge naturally spreads from
high-tech countries to low-tech countries over time (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555).

Great Powers Interaction in the Realm of Innovation
The dominant country might welcome the rising power's desire for technology
innovation. In this case, firstly, a dominant country which is also a world technology
leader will be in the best position to take advantage of technology sales to a rising power.
Secondly, the dominant country can also increase opportunities for cross-border
9
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collaboration in R&D with the rising power. However, at the same time, the innovation
activities of rising power can challenge the strategic interests of the dominant country.
These two characteristics of shape the relationship between technology and strategic
competition. Kennedy and Lim (2018, p.558) identify external effects closely related to
the strategic relationship between a rising power and the dominant country, namely
security externalities. Security externalities are defined as security implications that arise
as a by-product of economic interactions and can take various forms (William 2016, p.12).
It is stated that various trades with potential adversaries will result in negative security
externalities. Externalities associated with trading in 'dual use' technology – commercial
technology with potential military applications are likely to generate tension between the
great powers (William 2016, p.12).
Kennedy and Lim (2018, p.558) stated that negative security externalities caused
by the activity of rising power can result from two conditions. First, when there is concern
from the dominant country regarding the possibility of military conflict with the rising
power. While it is clearly possible, it is not always the case. For example, just as the U.S.
cared less about fighting Japan during the Cold War or against Brazil and India today
(Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.558). Second, the acquisition of certain technologies by rising
powers can increase their relative war capability or decrease the capability of the
dominant country. It generally occurs at a time when military technology is dual use in
nature, and acquisitions made by rising powers do not offer security benefits to the
dominant country (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.558).
In addressing security externalities, the dominant country is likely to act directly
to cut off the supply of relevant technology to the rising power. This will involve market
intervention to limit or prohibit certain transactions that cause concern, at least when the
technology is unavailable from other countries (Mastanduno 2017, p.289). Under the two
aforementioned conditions, the rising power approach in innovative imperative will result
in negative security externalities for the dominant country. This will further urge the
dominant country to take appropriate responses.
The innovative imperative illustrates the importance of emerging countries
acquiring and developing new technological systems to increase their influence and
overcome the structural challenges they face (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.556). This paper
conceptualises the innovative imperative as an innovation in weapons technology
development. Technological innovation can be projected by integrating AI capabilities in
the military sector.
10
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AI is considered the third revolution in warfare, leading to significant changes in
international affairs (Arif 2019, p.1). AI in the military sector is realised with the
development of AWS. According to the ICRC (2016 in UNODA 2017, p.1), AWS is any
weapon with autonomous capabilities that can select (search, detect, identify, track) and
strike (use force to fight, neutralise, damage, or destroy) targets without any direct and
meaningful interference from humans. This study will attempt to analyse China's
ambiguous attitude on the issue of AWS and the importance of this weapon technology
innovation for China's interests in the context of its rise.

The Conception of Strategic Ambiguity
Utilising the frameworks of rising power and technologically innovative imperative, this
article explores the utilisation of strategic ambiguity by a state. Strategic ambiguity is the
form of a 'hazy middle ground' position or a 'blurred middle ground.' This position seems
missing, too complex, or contradictory (Mandel 2019, p.68). This position reflects the
provision of inaccurate information that is vague and open to various interpretations or
appears to contradict statements and actions. Given that ambiguity makes it difficult for
the receiver to determine the correct signal interpretation, ambiguity has an important role
in 'deceptive communication' (Mandel 2019, p.73). The objectives of strategic ambiguity
are carried out with the explicit aim of maximising interests, triggering protection goals,
and minimising the impact of uncertain situations (Mandel 2019, p.227). The specific
purpose of strategic ambiguity in noisy environments allows actors to leave others in
doubt. When in a conflicting situation and not in line with the actor's interests, strategic
ambiguity provides a way out by placing the actor in a safe middle ground position.
Eisenberg (1984, p.35) also explained that when a country faces a conflict and systemic
obstacles, clarity is not always the best solution. On the other hand, an ambiguous stance
will allow the international community to defend their interpretations while believing that
collective action can be achieved.
Looking at China's empirical behaviour, it can be seen that there is a clear
relevance between the dynamics of the innovative imperative, the interaction of great
powers in the realm of innovation, and the ambiguous stance regarding the issue of AWS.
China as a rising power attaches great importance to the technologically innovative
imperative aimed at acquiring and creating new technologies to meet short-term and longterm growth goals in both the economic and military sectors. As Kennedy and Lim (2018,
p.558) described, transactions are essential when a rising power tries to obtain new
11
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technological innovations. While it innovates, especially in AWS, China conducts
commercial transactions with foreign entities because its ability to master certain
technology components is still limited. This point will be elaborated in the discussion.
This situation causes China to rely on technology transactions, mostly dependent
on imported technology originating from the U.S. (Fedasiuk 2020, p.20). Amid this
situation and the debate between the two major groups in the UN-CCW (countries that
reject and support AWS), China has instead taken the middle path. Being in a hazy middle
ground, China stated that it prohibits the use of AWS but not its development. This
position shows a contradiction. On the one hand, China firmly supports the development
of AWS, but on the other hand, China strongly prohibits its use. This strategic ambiguity
is carried out to trigger protection objectives, minimise the impact of uncertain situations,
and maximise interests.
This paper argues that China’s strategic ambiguity is not a mere coincidence.
However, it is a rational choice that China has calculated to meet its interests of the
innovative imperative, especially as a rising power. At the same time, its position that
rejects the use of AWS is because China still has a technological lag in a situation of
innovation. Therefore, China tends to take peaceful and compromised ways to ensure a
stable environment while trying to catch up. China's stance is relevant to the explain the
rising power's interest in the dynamics of the technologically innovative imperative and
the interaction of great powers in the realm of innovation.

RESEARCH METHOD
This research is explanatory research that aims to understand the factors behind China's
strategic ambiguity regarding the issue of AWS and to see how far this position is in line with
China's interests as a rising power. Explanative research is a type of research in which the
researcher explains the causal relationship (cause and effect) between two or more variables
(Sugiyono 2011, p.1). In this study, the variable analysed and explained is China's strategic
ambiguity regarding the issue of AWS, and the explanatory variables are the conception of
the innovative imperative and the interaction of the great powers in the realm of innovation.
The scope of this research is the period between 2016 and 2021 when China began to
show an ambiguous stance regarding the issue of AWS. However, the explanans from the
explanandum of this study may refer to previous years. This study uses primary and
secondary data sources where the primary sources in this study are government documents,
official statements in government speeches, and official UN reports.
12
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Meanwhile, secondary sources are books, journals, articles in books, newspapers,
working papers, position papers, publications conducted by credible think tanks and
institutions, and other references correlated with the research topic. In elaborating the
argument and answering the research questions, the author of this article uses qualitative
analysis techniques that emphasise the author's interpretation of the data sources that have
been obtained.

DISCUSSION
China's Rising Power Strategy and Strategic Ambiguity in Practice
Along with the emergence of China as a rising power came the perception of the 'China
threat,' which has been commonly debated since the 1990s (Wang 2009, p.1). China
understands that without effectively addressing the issue of the "China threat," its rising
will be hampered and would not be well received by the international community (Wang
2009, p.2). Intending to allay these concerns and suspicions, the Chinese political elite
created the idea of Peaceful Rise, which means that the rise of China will be peaceful and
beneficial not only for the Chinese but also for the whole world (Wang 2009, p.2). China's
Peaceful Rise can also be interpreted as China's strategy or way of ensuring a peaceful
condition in the midst of its rising, catching up, and responding to systemic limitations
(Yu 2018, p.1). At this point, China has always issued peaceful narratives in the sense
that China does not want to be involved in the conflict and emphasises that China will not
go to war at this time (Yu 2018, p.1). However, this does not guarantee that China will
not go to war in the future.
China usually adopts two approaches to achieving strategic ambiguity, both
inherited from China's strategic ruse and are currently studied in many Chinese military
and defence universities (Yu 2018, p.1). The first is "Hide a dagger in a smile" as one of
The Thirty-Six Strategies, which means "reassure the enemy to make him slack, work in
secret to subdue it" (Yu 2018, p.1). This is a method of hiding strong will under a
compliant appearance or, as China's supreme leader Deng Xiaoping put it, as an overall
national policy, "Hide your strength, bide your time" (Xiaoping in Yu 2018, p.1). Second,
"Battle of Pride," which refers to the tactic of showering the enemy with flattery to soften
his vigilance against his plans (Yu 2018, p.1). Thus, China's senior military leaders and
defence officials often issue narratives of peace and compromise to avoid raising concerns
about China's power until the right time comes, and lags have been overcome. When
China is still catching up with the gap or lag, it will tend to choose peaceful or compromise
way rather than controversial ways. China's Peaceful Rise is actually in line with the
13

Shangrina Putu Pramudia

stance of strategic ambiguity, which often shows a contradiction between China's
narratives in international forums and the actual activities.

China's Ambiguous Stance on Autonomous Weapon
Contemporary warfare innovation should lead to intelligent operations and focus on new
types of combat forces, including AI and AWS. At the same time, China has expressed
concern about AWS in several international fora, like UN-CCW and UNGA. However,
China's normative response is in stark contrast to its empirical behaviour. This section
will elaborate on China's ambiguous position on issues related to AWS.
First, at the UN-CCW meeting, China stated that it was essential to uphold "human
involvement, judgment, control and responsibility" in war (Hynek and Solovyeva 2020,
p.89). In the 2016 UN-CCW meeting, according to its position paper, China supported
the development of a legally binding protocol on the prohibition of AWS. It appeared that
China was the only P5 country that did not support the development and presence of AWS
(China in CCW 2016, p.1). However, in its 2018 UN-CCW position paper (China in UNCCW 2018, p.1) and statement by the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Debate on
Conventional Weapons at the First Committee of the 73rd Session of the UNGA (UN.org
2018, p.1), China did not mention in writing its support for an agreement. The new
position paper also justified China's actions in developing AWS as a form of anticipation
of the threat of AWS to civilians. Instead, China clarified that the ban on AWS would be
limited to its use, not its development (Kania 2017, p.12). Despite explicitly stating the
importance of human control and human dignity, the statement regarding compliance
with Chinese ethics and norms remained shrouded in ambiguity, chosen by China as an
effective strategy to reconcile normative pressures and preferences for strategic flexibility
in developing these weapons.
Second, China stated in its position paper at the 2016 UN-CCW on point II6
(China. Delegation to CCW 2016, p.1), 2018 point III7 (China. Delegation to CCW 2018,
p.1), and China's 2018-2019 statement at the Thematic Discussion on Conventional Arms
Control at the First Committee of the 73rd and 74th Session of the UNGA (UN.org 2018,
p.1; FMPRC 2019, p.1), that as a method of warfare, the use of AWS should in principle
be regulated by IHL, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Additional
Protocols, including the principles of limitation, distinction and proportionality.
However, in its application, AWS presents considerable uncertainty, that these weapons
are not capable of; (1) distinguishing between enemies and civilians; (2) taking
proportional decisions; (3) creating difficulties regarding the accountability of its use
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(China. Delegation to CCW 2016, p.1). However, in 2017 China issued AIDP, which
became the basis for China's development of AWS (Roberts et al. 2020, p.59). China's
action to issue the AIDP has violated its commitment to the UN-CCW, because by issuing
the AIDP China has planned the development, production and use of AWS. While calling
for a ban on the use of AWS, political elites in China are carrying out an AI-based military
transformation that causes fundamental changes in military unit programming,
operational styles, equipment systems, and combat power generation models, which will
eventually lead to a profound military revolution to deal with intelligentised warfare in
the future (Kania 2017, p.12).
Third, China supported weapons control mechanisms for AI systems in military
robotics because AI-related arms control will be challenging. After all, AI can be
disseminated and cannot be monitored easily (Allen 2018, p.5). At the Human Rights
Council (HRC) in 2013, China highlighted the potential for AWS that could disrupt the
international strategic balance and affect arms control (HRW 2020, p.1). However, China
also sees the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a lucrative market for AWS sales.
China has aggressively offered and exported cheap but low-quality AWS, such as the
Chang Hong-3 and CH-4 UCAVs to that region (Romaniuk and Burgers 2020, p.1). In
addition, weapons such as the Wing Loong I proved ideal for MENA states given the
threat from local insurgents and the government's intention for a rapid and effective
response (Romaniuk and Burgers 2020, p.1).
Fourth, China's ambiguous stance towards AWS can also be seen through its
participation in The Campaign to Stop Killer Robot.8 Since 2018, China has committed
to supporting the campaign even if it does not stop the development of these weapons
(CSKR 2018, p.1). China's behaviour contradicted other AWS developer countries, which
those countries tend to reject and not get involved in several international campaigns
regarding the issue on AWS.. In Stop Killer Robots, China believes that the rise of AWS
is a humanitarian problem, so there needs to be international rules that control this issue
(CSKR 2018, p.1). On the other hand, China feels the need to develop and produce AWS
to become a world leader in AI by 2030 (CSKR 2018, p.1). While continue developing
and producing AWS, China maintains its rhetorical commitment to supporting a ban on
the use of such weapons in combat.

China's Point of View on Technologically Innovative Imperative and Autonomous
Weapon
Since 2013 China has published several national policy documents that reflect its
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intention to develop and implement AI in various sectors. First, in 2015, China released
a 10-year plan guideline, 'Made in China 2025,' which was released to turn China into a
dominant player in global high-tech manufacturing, including AI (McBride and Chatzky
2019, p.74). President Xi Jinping wants China to be one of the most innovative countries
in the world by 2020 and a leading global science and technology power by 2049
(Dominguez 2015, p.1). Made in China 2025 is considered China's version of Industry
4.0 concerning the 'Chinese National Destiny' (Zhou and Wang 2019, p.1). Second, the
Communist Party of China's (CCP) Five-Year Plan was published in March 2016. The
document mentions AI as one of the six critical areas for developing the country's
burgeoning industry and as an essential factor in promoting economic growth. The
documents and the framework of strategic objectives demonstrate China's grand ambition
to become a major player and global leader in the AI sector. Third, the establishment of
the 'New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan' (AIDP) in 2017 which sets
out strategic goals and describes the overarching goal of making China a world leader in
AI by 2030 and making AI the main driving force for China's industrial upgrading and
economic transformation (China. Department of International Cooperation: Ministry of
Science and Technology 2017, p.44).
The enthusiasm of China in developing AI is also because AI has become a new
focus in international competition (McBride and Chatzky 2019, p.75). The official AIDP
document shows a longitudinal perspective on China's strategic situation regarding AI,
including its comparative capabilities, opportunities, and potential risks. The document
has highlighted strategic areas where AI can make a substantial difference in China,
including international competition, economic development, and military transformation.
First, in the realm of international competition – AIDP stated that, "For China, the military
AI R&D is seen as a possible and easy way to challenge the American military hegemony"
(AIDP in Ozdemir, 2019, p.18).
Although China and the U.S. are described as geopolitical rivals, the military
budgets of the two powers are still significantly different. China has the second-largest
military budget globally, with $175 billion allocated in 2019, but its spending is still only
one-third of the U.S.’s budget (Chan and Zhen 2019, p.45). Rather than spending money
on conventional weapons, China sees investment in AI as an opportunity to make radical
breakthroughs in military technology and thus compete with the U.S. (Chan and Zhen
2019, p.45). This emphasises that China must be able to take advantage of the strategic
opportunities provided by AI to make 'leapfrog developments' in its national capabilities.
The desire to rival the U.S. is echoed in statements from China's political and military
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leadership, such as President Xi Jinping stating in 2017 that, "Under a situation of
increasing fierce international military competition, only the innovators win" (Xi Jinping
2017 in Kania 2020, p.2).
Second, on economic development the AIDP stated that AI would be the driving
force behind a new round of industrial transformation that will inject new kinetic energy
into China's economic growth. A report by PwC (2017, p.1), Sizing the Prize, shows that
China is the country that will benefit the most from AI, with a 26% increase in GDP by
2030. This forecast also shows that AI could facilitate a 12% increase in employment
over the next two decades (PwC 2017, p.1). In 2018, the investment value in China's AI
industry reached 131.1 billion RMB, an increase of about 67.7 billion RMB compared to
2017 (Daxue Consulting 2020, p.8). The scale of the investment gives China the first
position in the world ranking in AI investment (Daxue Consulting 2020, p.8).
Third, in the 2019 Defence White Paper or China's National Defence in the New
Era (CNDINE), China has positioned itself as a country capable of achieving Great Power
status. It was stated that one of China’s aspirations is to achieve "informatisation" and
"mechanisation" for its military (CNDINE 2019, p.8). In terms of the PLA reforms, China
has developed a new unit, namely the Strategic Support Force, a unit tasked with testing
out new military technology before it is applied to specific dimensions (CNDINE 2019,
p.8). China also expressed its desire to integrate disruptive technological developments
with its military and strives to always be at the forefront of empowering the latest
technologies (CNDINE 2019, p.9). Xi Jinping has called for "strengthening the military
through science and technology" while highlighting the unique opportunities and
challenges resulting from the current global military revolution (Kania 2017, p.12). Xi
Jinping urges that China seize the highest place and vigorously advance military
innovation, which requires technological innovation. Integrating AI in the Chinese
military will support command decision-making, defence equipment, the reduction of
military personnel, and other areas. Lieutenant General Lui Guozhi, director of the
Central Military Commission for Science and Technology, stated that the world is in a
scientific revolution, and technological progress is entering the intelligence era (Kania
2017, p.13). Therefore, it is necessary to anticipate AI to accelerate the process of military
transformation, causing fundamental changes in military unit programming, operational
style, equipment systems, and combat power generation models, which will eventually
lead to a profound military revolution.
Therefore, we can conclude that China, as a rising power, gives a positive response
to technological innovation and views that the need for innovation is a top national
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priority. This is because significant breakthroughs in critical areas can substantially
change the balance of economic and military power in the future. While in the 1990s,
China was only the assembly centre for many high-tech products, it has emerged as an
important player in technological innovation over the last decade. This change reflects a
clear shift in China's national priorities. Its efforts dramatically increased in the 21st
century, demonstrating a strong belief that China must improve the economic value chain.
There is a positive correlation between technological innovation, scientific and technical
strength, and China's economic strength. The prominence of the Chinese economy in the
global competition is mainly determined by its technological innovation capabilities.
Thus, technology is an endogenous driving force behind overall changes in global politics
and the economy. Therefore, big countries, including China, strengthen their economic
capacity through continuous technological innovation, giving them strong bargaining
power and absolute competitiveness.
The PLA's great pursuit of innovation is an element of China's national strategy
to utilise science and technology to pursue great power status. Currently, there are various
military and civilian research institutes focusing on the development of China's AWS,
including; (1) China Electronic Technology Group Companies (CETC); (2) China
Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC); (3) UAV Technology Research
Institute; (4) National Key Laboratory of Robotic Systems and Engineering of Harbin
Institute of Technology; (5) Tsinghua University; (6) Beihang University; and (7)
Northwest Polythetic University (Kania 2017, p.24). Furthermore, the Chinese Ministry
of National Defence established two new research and development organisations in 2018
under the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT), namely the Unmanned
System Research Centre (USRC) and the Artificial Intelligence Research Centre (AIRC).
China's capacity to develop AWS is estimated at an annual budget of $250 billion and
$4.5 billion for drone technology by 2021 (SIPRI 2019 in Haner and Gracia 2019, p.333).
In addition, Chinese companies have tested swarming technology by synchronising more
than 1,000 drones (Haner and Gracia 2019, p.333).
In line with the three strategic areas where AI can make a substantial difference
in China, this paper highlights two significant drivers for China to develop AWS; (1)
China's concern towards Intelegentised Warfare; and (2) AWS as a new promising
industry which can booster China's economy. First, China views that Intelligentized
Warfare in the future is considered a stage beyond informatisation that will require a
significant change in its approach to force development and modernisation (Wang 2015,
p.76). China's 'information revolution' has progressed through three stages; (1)
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digitisation, (2) network, and (3) intelligence (Wang 2015, p.76). The PLA has actively
pursued AI-enabled systems and autonomous capabilities in its military modernisation
efforts. The PLA has fielded more advanced unmanned robotic and missile systems
(Kania 2020, p.3). China's defence industry is building a visible force of armed drones
and missiles to introduce greater autonomy in operations and exploration. China also
utilises the application of AWS in its defence industry, where China has built ballistic
missiles through automation (Kania 2020, p.5). The Chinese military has revamped older
tank models and fighter variants that initially operated via remote control and now have
some degree of autonomy. Here are some examples of AWS being developed by Chinese
AI companies:
Table 2. China's Development of Autonomous Weapons
Company
AVIC
CASC
NORINCO

Yunzhou Intelligence

Example of Autonomous Weapons
GJ-11 Sharp Sword UCAV;
ASN-301 Loitering Munition.
CH-901;
WS-43 Loitering Munition.
Cavalry;
War Wolf;
Sharp Claw;
King Leopard UGVs.
SE40;
TC40;
Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs).
Source: Slippery Slope 2019, p.8.

Zeng Yi, a senior executive at a Chinese defence company, described China's
hopes for AWS on a futuristic battlefield. Zeng stated that, "In future battlegrounds, there
will be no people fighting" (Zeng in Allen 2019, p.8). Zeng predicts that by 2025 AWS
will become very common and believes that the increasing use of AI in the military is
inevitable. In the future intelligentised wars, the AI system will function as a warrior
(Allen 2019, p.6). The supremacy of intelligence will be at the core of future warfare. AI
can completely transform the current command structure, which humans dominate, into
one dominated by 'AI clusters' (Allen 2019, p.6).
China increasingly refers to intelligent or 'intelligentised' military technology as a
hope for future warfare bases. China places great emphasis on Military Intelligentisation
or the development of Military Intelligent, which focuses on AI-enabled autonomous
systems in its operational aspects. China's military initiatives in AI are also motivated by
the awareness of global trends in military technology and operations; concerns about
falling behind the US military, which is considered and often characterised as a "powerful
adversary"; and recognition of the potential opportunities inherent in military
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transformation through these technologies. Through modernisation, China's military
transformation is consistent with its efforts to achieve great power status. When taking
power as China's 'Fifth Generation' leader in 2012, President Xi sought to achieve the
'China's Dream' (Chong Meng) – a strong and prosperous China that will gain great power
status in 2049. In Xi's vision, military transformation is fundamental to actualise the
'China's Dream' and achieve the main national objectives; (1) the unparalleled authority
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); (2) modernity – sustainable economic progress;
and (3) sovereignty – the integration of the claimed territory with the homeland (Gen
2020, p.1). Thus, the PLA's pursuit of innovation is an element of China's national
strategy to utilise science and technology to pursue great power status.
Second, regarding a new promising industry – currently, China has led the export
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) systems (SIPRI 2020, p.1). Chinese UAVs such as
the Wing Loong platform of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and the
CH-4 developed by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)
are actively marketed for export. China's CASC has even succeeded in opening factories
for the CH-4 platform in Myanmar, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia (SIPRI 2020, p.1). The
ASN-301 autonomous weapon system produced by AVIC was shown for the first time in
Abu Dhabi in 2017 (Slippery Slope 2019, p.23). The CH-901 and WS-43 produced by
China Aerospace Long-March (ALIT) were first publicly displayed at the 2016 Defence
Service Asia Exhibition (DSA) in Malaysia and in Jordan in 2018 (Slippery Slope 2019,
p.23). The weapon system on display can deliver a payload of up to 20 kg at a distance of
up to 60 km and can track and attack both moving and static targets. To date, China is
one of the major players exporting AWS. Zeng Yi, a Chinese Defence Company senior
executive, said that China had exported many military aerial drones to Middle Eastern
countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Allen 2019, p.10). The drones exported are
the latest armed drones with significant combat autonomy capabilities (Allen 2019, p.10).
Ziyan, a Chinese military armed drone manufacturer, has sold the A2 Blowfish model to
the UAE. In November 2019, Ziyan was reported to be negotiating with Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan for a contract to sell the A2 Blowfish (Zeng in Allen 2019, p.10). Equipped with
missiles, AK-47 automatic machine guns, or mortar-sized ammunition, the Blowfish A2
is able to autonomously conducts combat on complex missions, including time detection,
fixed range reconnaissance, and precision-targeted strikes (Allen 2019, p.10). Blowfish
A2 has been operating and exported in various Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa
(Xuanzun 2019, p.1).
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Strategic Constraints and Great Powers Interaction in the Realm of Autonomous
Weapon
Despite the various advantages offered, there are several constraints that China is
currently facing in the development of autonomous weapon. China's 2018 White Paper
on Artificial Intelligence Standards shows that China's AI ecosystem is lagging in several
key areas:
"China’s strengths are mainly shown in AI applications and it is still weak on the
front of core technologies of AI, such as hardware and algorithm development,
China’s AI development lacks top-tier talent and has a significant gap with
developed countries, especially the U.S., in this regard" (White Paper China 2018,
p.12).
There are several comparative weaknesses in China’s AI ecosystem. However,
this paper will focus on three main things that are most related to the development of
autonomous weapon, namely: (1) AI Top Talent; (2) Software Frameworks and
Platforms; and (3) Semiconductors. First, a report by China's Tsinghua University
describing global AI talent distribution concluded that at the end of 2017 there was a top
international talent pool of 204,575 individuals, with the U.S. having 28,536 individuals
and China in second place with 18,323 (Kai-Fuu and Matt 2018, p.1). However, China
ranks eighth in the world regarding top AI talent, with only 977 individuals compared to
the U.S.'s 5,518 individuals (Kai-Fuu and Matt 2018, p.1). Second, China’s CAICT AI
and Security White Paper shows that to date, research and development of domestic AI
products and applications has been primarily based on Microsoft and Google (CAICT
2018, p.37). Although most of the world’s consumer electronics products are now labeled
‘Made in China,’ many of these are assembled with high-value semiconductor chips
designed in the U.S. and manufactured in South Korea or Taiwan (Allen 2019, p.13). In
fact, in the autonomous drone weapons market, where leading Chinese company DJI
Technologies enjoys a 74 per cent share of the global market, 35 per cent of bill materials
on each of those drones are U.S. content, mainly semiconductors (Allen 2019, p.13).
Third, China is still struggling in critical core technologies, including semiconductors and
AI, which are essential for AWS development (Wu et al. 2019, p.1). Semiconductors
enable autonomous weapon to carry out missions, targeting, data processing, and attacks
with autonomy (Karr 2013, p.3). As mentioned by Karr, there are several essential
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functions of semiconductors in AWS, including: (1) targeting systems; (2) industrial
control systems; (3) microelectronics throughout; (3) flight software system; (4) database;
(5) identify friend or foe systems; (6) communication system; and (7) controller area
network bus (Karr 2013, p.3).
It is common knowledge that Chinese companies cannot manufacture advanced
semiconductor devices capable of running the complex neural networks required for
military-grade systems. It is estimated that over 90% of China's high-end chips depend
on imports, 100% of DRAM memory, 99% of CPU, and 93% of MEMS sensors all rely
on imports from countries such as the U.S., South Korea, and Japan (Fedasiuk 2020,
p.20). China’s lag in the semiconductor industry, compared with the U.S., can be seen in
the graphic below. U.S. semiconductor companies have maintained a leading position in
R&D, design, and process technology (SIA 2019, p.3). They also have the largest market
share with 45 per cent, compared to other countries’ industries that have between 5 and
24 per cent of the global market share (SIA 2019, p.3). The Semiconductor Industry
Association (SIA) also reported that the U.S. is still the largest producer of
semiconductors since 1993 (SIA 2019, p.3). Meanwhile, China still occupies the lowest
position compared to other large semiconductor-producing countries.
Figure 1. Global Market Share for Semiconductor Industry in 2018

Source: (SIA 2019, p.3)

Source: (SIA 2019, p.3)
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Figure 2. Global Producers of Semiconductor

Source: (SIA 2019, p.3)

The graphics above show that China still has a significant lag, especially in the
semiconductor industry, which forces China to depend on imported components from
countries to develop AWS. It can be seen that China is still growing and has not been able
to conquer the competition of AWS due to China’s inability to master critical technologies
in the development of the weapon system.
In addition to the technological lag that causes China’s dependence on foreign
products in developing its AWS, a systemic constraint arises from China's interaction
with a dominant country in the realm of technology innovation. China’s foreign
investment in foreign technology assets is an essential element of China's response to
innovation imperatives and has increased rapidly in recent years. From 2005 to 2016,
Chinese companies made 90 investments totaling over US$56 billion in various foreign
companies (Kennedy and Lim 2018, p.555). The U.S. is a popular destination for Chinese
investment, reflecting the active support of the Chinese authorities. However, China’s
technology investment efforts have resulted in negative security externalities for the U.S.,
especially at a time when the U.S. views that trade in ‘dual use’ technology—commercial
technology with potential military applications—could raise the possibility of military
conflict with China and that China’s acquisition of semiconductor technology could
increase its relative war capabilities. Moreover, a final report created by the U.S. National
Security Commission on AI warned that China could soon replace the U.S. as the world’s
"AI superpower" and expressed there are severe military implications to consider, even
though at the current status quo China is still far behind in terms of Global
Competitiveness (The U.S. National Security Commission on AI 2021, p.2). Third,
China’s increased number of arms sales to potential U.S. adversaries could threaten U.S.
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values and interests. There are also concerns that these sales could accelerate the
proliferation of capabilities of non-state actors.
Although the U.S. is generally open to foreign investment, the U.S. government
does consider the national security implications of some of the investments included in
the Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (Kennedy and Lim
2018, p.556). Chaired by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, CFIUS is authorised to
review transactions that may result in foreign control of U.S. business to determine the
effect of such transactions on national security. When there is clear evidence that a
transaction will threaten U.S. national security, the committee can recommend that the
president block it. Following the advice of CFIUS, in 2017, the U.S. blocked several
investment attempts by Chinese entities. For instance, the blocking involved China’s
Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund from acquiring Aixtron, a German semiconductor
company with a subsidiary in California (U.S. Department of Treasury n.d, p.1). Aixtron
is known for producing systems for making semiconductors with Gallium Nitride (Gan),
which have military applications, including in anti-ballistic missile systems, due to their
resistance to heat and radiation (Paul and Perlez 2016, p.1). Another blocking involved
the Chinese consortium Canyon Bridge Capital Partners from acquiring Oregon-based
Lattice Semiconductor. The U.S. National Security and Defense explained that:

"The national-security risk posed by the transaction relates to, among other
things, the potential transfer of IP to the foreign acquirer, the Chinese
government’s role in supporting this transaction, the importance of semiconductor
supply chain integrity to the United States Government, and the use of Lattice
products by the United States Government" (U.S. National Security and Defense
2017, p.1).
While President Xi stated that China’s goal is "Being the master of its
technologies," insecurity seems to be a natural sentiment for the U.S. The U.S. is facing
threatening competition from China’s plans to become the leader of high-level
technological innovation that is believed to have substantially threatened U.S. global
hegemony. Secretary of State Pompeo called on U.S. technology companies to stay away
from any business with China that might strengthen the Chinese military, "tighten the
regime’s grip repression," or help "power a truly Orwellian surveillance state" (U.S.
Department of State 2020, p.1). In addition, taking a strategic stance is very important in
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this critical situation, which is further reflected in China’s strategic ambiguity in the issue
of AWS.
China’s Strategic Ambiguity Stance as a Result of Technologically Innovative
Imperative Dynamics
It can be seen that China has shown an attitude of ambiguity which according to Mandel
is a form of a ‘hazy middle ground’ stance where this stance seems to be missing, too
complex or contradictory (Mandel 2019, p.8). However, the ambiguous stance becomes
clear and rational when factors influencing it are examined. This paper concludes that
there are at least several main factors are the reasons behind China’s strategic ambiguity
stance on the issue of AWS.
The ambiguous stance is taken because China needs to maintain the consistency
of the Peaceful Rise narrative by following international forums that exist within the
framework of peace and humanitarianism. The consistency of the China Peaceful Rise
narrative must be maintained as a strategy so that China is not perceived as a threat by the
international community, which can ultimately hinder China’s rise. From grand strategy
to sectoral strategy, China has taken a similar approach. This approach implies that while
China is still lagging behind, it needs a peaceful situation. China does not want to be
involved in war and emphasises that countries do not need to see China as a threat. China
has a tradition that to catch up the gap, it tends to choose peace or compromises over
controversy while it is still developing its strength. This is intended so that the rise of
China will not be hampered or hindered systemically. In addition, to support consistency
in its narrative of peaceful rise, China has also often stated that its development of AWS
is focused on the defensive aspect.
Despite having big ambitions in AI innovation, especially in weapons systems,
China is still not capable of conquering or dominating this new weapon system due to
restricted access to core technologies. This paper argues that China's ambiguous stance
regarding the issue of AWS is related to the current dynamics of the technologically
innovative imperative in the context of China’s rise. First, China still finds itself in some
technological lags and systemic barriers resulting from its interaction with the U.S. as the
dominant state. Second, this lag prompted China to take peaceful measures, especially by
actively contributing to several international forums. These peaceful measures are
essential to avoid a position that could potentially trigger counter-productive tensions to
China's innovation activities. Third, China wants to ensure that its innovation efforts will
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not hinder its rise. Therefore, amidst its interest as a rising power and the emergence of
complexity in AWS innovation, as well as the obstacles and pressures China faces, the
ambiguous stance finds its justification. Thus, through this strategic ambiguity, China can
maximise its interests in the realm of AWS innovation and be prepared for future warfare.
This paper shows how China contradicts its position – especially when China is
aggressively developing AWS and actively contributing at the UN-CCW or other
international forums to voicing the threat of AI arms race. However, paying attention to
the arms race dynamics while aggressively participating in it is a common story in the
history of international relations. This ambiguous and rhetorical move allowed China to
receive positive media attention for its support to global restrictions while masking the
hypocrisy of China’s development of military autonomy and more advanced industries.
The Chinese regime has successfully projected strengths while hiding weaknesses by
controlling information leaving their borders. As a researcher, it is essential to distinguish
between the image that China seeks to present and the reality it faces.

CONCLUSION
This study has elaborated the arguments regarding the reasons behind China’s ambiguous
stance on the issue of AWS. It has explained that China’s ambiguous stance is a form of
strategy in dealing with the innovative imperative dynamics, especially AI-based AWS
that are in line with the China’s fast-growing status as a rising power. AI-based weapon
innovation, especially AWS, has been essential in this situation. With these innovations,
China can boost its economy, military modernisation and achieve the Chinese National
Destiny and China’s Dream to become a great power. This, in turn, encourages China’s
grand ambition to develop AWS and become a Global Leader of AI as reflected in the
various policy issued by its government. However, amid its need to develop AWS, China
has been active in various international forums such as the UN-CCW and the Campaign
to Stop Killer Robots in which it echoed the ban on these weapons. This shows a
contradiction and ambiguous stance made by China, especially as it is promoting the
Peaceful Rise narrative.
China provides explanations regarding the need for innovative imperatives in the
context of the China’s rise through speeches, official statements, position papers, national
policy, and state documents such as its white paper. From the findings above, it can be
seen that; First, China tends to act peacefully with the Peaceful Rise Narratives as its
power continues to rise. Second, China’s strategic ambiguity is also based on historical
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strategic understanding. Third, China has a positive response to technological innovation
and argues that its ambition to become a Global AI Leader is part of its Chinese National
Destiny. Fourth, as explained in the National Defence white paper, China has positioned
itself as capable of achieving great power status. One way to achieve this stage is by
strengthening the military through science and technology. Fifth, China shows strategic
ambiguity in issues related to AWS and in its involvement in international forums. This
ambiguity is a deliberate act that can strategically help China maximise its interests and
face the challenges in innovation dynamics. Sixth, China views AWS as essential in
modernising the military to deal with Intelligentised Warfare and as a new prospectus
industry. Seventh, despite having grand ambitions and efforts in AI innovation, it can be
said that China is still in the growing stage and has not yet reached the conquering or
dominating stage. This is seen through the several lags and systemic constraints that
China faces. Eighth, China faces systemic constraints due to its rivalry with the U.S. in
‘dual use’ technological innovation. Due to the negative security externalities perceived
by the U.S., the U.S. seeks to impede China from assessing U.S.’ technology. Ninth, with
its strategic ambiguity, China seeks to maintain the consistency of China’s Peaceful Rise,
gain legitimacy for its AWS development while creating a situation where it can put limits
on the development of more advanced U.S. autonomous weapon.
The author realises that this paper focuses on China’s ambiguous stance and does
not elaborate further on how other countries, like the U.S., view this ambiguous stance.
This creates a new space for further research, which can focus on responses from the U.S.
and the international community to China’s ambiguous stance and how this stance
impacts the prospect of global security, especially in the realm of new weapons
development.
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Note:
1

According to Nils J. Nilsson (2020, p.1), "AI is that activity devoted to making machines intelligent, and
intelligence is that quality that enables an entity to function appropriately and with foresight in its
environment."
2
Strategic ambiguity is a form of a ‘hazy middle ground’ position where this position seems to be missing,
too complex (too complex) or contradictory (contradictory) (Mandel 2019, p.68).
3
UN-CCW is a body under the United Nations which is a forum for every international actor to discuss or
form regulations on international weapons issues.
4
GGE-LAWS was formed under the UN-CCW in 2016 which contains technology experts and
representatives from each country to examine issues related to autonomous weapons in the context of the
objectives of the UN-CCW.
5
The document contains the strategic goal of making China as the world leader in AI by 2030 and making
AI the main driving force for China's economic and military transformation.
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6

Point II Of China Position Paper in UN-CCW 2016 stated that "as a method of warfare, use of LAWS
should be governed in principle by international humanitarian laws, such as the 1949 Geneva Convention
and its two 1977 Additional Protocols, including the principles of restriction, distinction and
proportionality. However, such weapons systems present, in the application of the above principles,
considerable uncertainties: 1. Whether such a weapons system is capable of distinction remains doubtful;
2. Such a weapons system is incapable of proportionate decisions; 3. Such a weapons system presents
difficulty in terms of accountability for its use" (China. Delegation to CCW 2016, p.1).
7
Point III of China Position Paper in UN-CCW 2018 "as means of warfare, LAWS should, in principle, be
subject to international humanitarian rules set out in the 1949 Geneva Convention and the two Additional
Protocols of 1977, including the principles of precautions, distinction and proportionality. However, as such
weapon systems are concerned, application of the above-mentioned principles is confronted with a great
deal of uncertainties. Firstly it is doubtful whether this type of weapon systems possess any capability of
distinction; secondly this type of weapon systems lack the capability of making decisions concerning
proportionality; thirdly, it is difficult to establish accountability when this type of weapon systems are used.
It is therefore necessary, when exploring LAWS- related legal issues, to have full consideration of the
applicability of general legal norms to LAWS" (China. Delegation to CCW 2018, p.1).
8
The Campaign to Stop Killer Robot is a form of global community rejection of autonomous weapons
(killer robots), initiated in May 2008. This coalition of non-governmental organizations has urged the
government and the United Nations to adopt policies that prohibit the development and use of autonomous
weapons systems.
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